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Abstract:  
Romania’s special economic situation during the Second World War  did not deter it from 
allying with the United Nations and contributing economically, military and politically to the war 
effort. Romania occupied the fourth place in the world after the Soviet Union, United Nations 
and Great Britain which was an honorable thing given that its economy had been deeply affected 
by the German ally till 23 August and  after this date,  by the Soviet one. 
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Romania's participation in the Second World War represented a point of maximum economic, political 
and material effort of the Romanian state given that its potential had been seriously affected by political 
submittals in the summer of 1940. The chaotic economic activities were nothing but one of the most 
serious economic argument which interested the Romanian authorities. Undoubtedly, the economic 
transition during the Antonescu regime along with the Romanian army mobilization in the anti-Soviet 
warfare worsened the economic conditions so that the Romanian authorities soon needed to introduce 
certain restrictions on main food and goods (oil, cereals, etc.). 
 The increasing of the German economic, military and political control would aim the achievement of the 
Third Reich’s goals, but with respect to the Romanian side, its participation would be preferable along 
with the Germans than with the Russians, who, however, were not interested in supporting the Romanian 
interests in Transylvania, on the contrary, they were assiduously looking to occupy Romanian territories 
(Markham R. H., 1996). Fully aware of Romania’s delicate political and military situation, Hitler 
disregarded to inform Antonescu about the future plans of the German military offensive. Prior to the first 
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meeting between the two, it was taken in Berlin the decision to increase the troops of the German military 
mission in Romania, called by both king Carol and Antonescu,  in order to train the Romanian troops. 
But the German concerns for training and equipping the Romanian army were placed last, in the 
Wermaht's view the missions of the headquarters and German troops in Romania were: 
• defense of the oil region against predatory intentions of a third power and against 
destruction as well; 
• training the Romanian army fallowing a strict plan, according to the German interests, in 
order to solve the given tasks; 
• preparation of the German and Romanian troops in case of war with Russia, having as 
starting point Romania. 
 Moreover, Hitler had asked the German commanders of the troops stationed in Romania to avoid 
at all costs the "appearance of a military occupation of Romania” (DuŃu Al., 2000) Given the negative 
findings of the German military authorities in Berlin regarding the Romanian army, it can be concluded 
that the stated aim of the Reich’s troops in Romania was in fact masking its true political and military 
intentions (A-H, 1991). Contrary to all appearances, the Romanian army received significant support from 
Wehrmacht, consisting in improving the combat readiness and military technique. However, the received 
aid was far from being sufficient, the entire corps of command of the Romanian army being fully aware 
of this aspect.. 
    From the economic point of view, as early as 1939, Germany had managed to impose Romania 
tax incentives- these being part of the concession policy- through an economic agreement which damaged 
the economy. The evolution of economic exchanges between the two countries showed how Germany 
managed to acquire a monopoly position in relation with Romania. For instance, of the total Romanian 
exports between 1941-1944, the exchanges with Germany and its allies were situated between 95.16% -
98.77% given that the German state made serious economic pressures with respect to the economic 
embargo on Romanian products with third countries. 
From a certain point of view, the situation was, however, in the pipeline specially because the summer of 
the 1940 was one of the worst, due to territorial losses, but the entry of the German troops in the country 
coincided with the installation of additional safety and national security, especially in the eastern border. 
The maintenance of the German Troops on Romanian territory, the payment system, the deductions 
resulting from the transport and communication activities were other "trouble spots" of the collaboration 
with the Third Reich in the anti-Soviet war. While the  military units and the German import-export 
companies made supplies at minimum prices for main products, the goods imported from Germany were 
absolutely irrelevant for the Romanian market’s needs, not to mention their inflated prices. Romania's 
complex situation internationally made it extremely vulnerable to the claims of its German ally, who was 
aware that this economic cooperation would lack in any adverse reaction from Romania. All these 
reasons, which  alloyed the Romanian-German collaboration, resulted from the fact that once having 
accepted to participate in the military campaign from the east, the Romanian authorities lost sight of 
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"small details of the collaboration", although the legal situation of Romania was similar to an independent 
and sovereign state which was fighting against a common enemy. 
Even the two countries had begun to make significant services or concessions on a reciprocal basis once 
with the accession to power of general Antonescu, his availability to participate from the outset in a 
potential German-Soviet military conflict, would not be able to fade the public opinion’s conviction that 
Germany was the main artisan of the Romanian State’s disruption in the summer of 1940, and that 
Romania had been treated as an object of foreign affairs. 
During bilateral trades, even Romania received from Germany irrelevant products for its economic 
development, the former was required to deliver large quantities of prime necessities goods to the 
population and in order to support the economic effort of war. Further unfavorable facts materialized in 
prewar pricing even if this was well below world market price at that time. Calculations showed that the 
average price paid by the Germans per tones of oil was of 6600 lei while on the world market this was of 
13,500 fact which, between October 1940 and August 23, 1944, helped Germany to receive over 6 million 
tons of oil for free from Romania. At the same time, the prices for the arms delivered by Romania to 
Germany were increased groundlessly by over 20 billion lei fact acknowledged even by the German 
Embassy’s representatives in Bucharest in the diplomatic correspondence with Berlin (Constantinescu 
N.N., 2000). 
An estimated average of price evolution of German and Romanian products showed that the former 
increased with an average of 614% while the latter only reached 123%.This way, the unequal exchanges 
between Romania and Germany during the Second World War worsened intensely the economic situation 
of our country and forced it  to pay maintenance costs for the German military mission while 
simultaneously having to support economically  the Romanian army on the Eastern Front. 
Another aspect which undermined the Romanian economy was the arbitrarily increase of the German 
mark made against the Romanian leu from 50 lei in 1939 to 60lei on April 1941, the prejudices being 
estimated at almost 910 billion lei in 1938. Also, the payment system between the two countries, 
according to the agreement of December 4, 1940, was in the Germans’ advantage who did not respect 
their tax obligations towards Romania, the authorities being practically obliged to credit the German State 
and pay its bills to Romanian companies. Furthermore, the extensive use of the railway and telegraph 
infrastructure and the circulation on the Romanian market of large amounts of German currency (German 
residents in Romania had the right to send monthly packages of goods in Germany bought on the 
Romanian market). The amounts collected from the calculation of interest, penalties and of other 
economic forms economic between the two sides converged towards the figure of 62 billion lei during the 
1938 (approximately 450 billions dollars), not to mention the wear and damage of the Romanian 
infrastructure caused by the Germans. 
These costs would not be acknowledged at the Peace Conference from Paris, only a small percentage of 
Germany's financial obligations would be taken into consideration, though arbitrarily calculated and 
obviously incomplete. The Armistice between Romania and the United Nations signed on 12 September 
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1944 would represent the overall framework for the unfolding of Romania's military campaign against 
Germany and its satellites. The Implementation of its terms would be the responsibility of the Allied 
Control Commission. According to the agreements of the Big Three Romania would be thrown into the 
arms of the Soviet Union. The brutal interference of the Control Commission’s representatives would 
decisively affect the internal political events, thus disturbing the state budget through massive 
withdrawals of goods seized through the Armistice Agreement. 
Determined to proceed as soon as possible the improvement of the Soviet-Romanian relations and 
Transylvania’s liberation, the Romanian authorities would send to the front more military units than the 
12 divisions provided by the armistice. With respect to the number of Romanian troops engaged in the 
military operations against Germany, this was amounted to about 538,536 soldiers, out of a total of 
1,100,000 assigned to the United Nations (Muresan, M., Muresan, M., 1998). The Romanian armies 
would cover, between August 23 1944 and May 12, 1945, an average of 1,700 kilometers, forcing 12 
rivers and 20 mountain ranges and capturing the 3831 villages among which 53 major cities. All these 
were possible with the sacrifice of the 169,822 soldiers killed, wounded and missing. Romania's 
contribution to the cause of the United Nations would be significant, leading to the war shortening  with 
about 200 days and giving them a strategic material and human advantage. 
Although Romania’s economic war effort, estimated to the enormous amount of 1,200,000,000 dollars 
(acc. to the currency in 1938), had situated it on the fourth place in the hierarchy of the United Nations 
fighting  against Germany, its justly deserve co-belligerent status would be denied for political reasons 
known only to the Great Powers. Of all the states which were are in a situation somehow similar to that of 
Romania’s, none of them made the military or economic effort at the same scale as Romania did in 
defeating the Nazi war machine. 
The coup of August 23 and Romania's transition alongside the United Nations, would be in all respects, a 
very unpleasant surprise for both Germans, but especially for the Soviets, who were now prepared to go 
into detail that "division of responsibilities" in the Balkans, strongly requested by the  British Prime 
Minister W. Churchill. The royal decision for the making of volta-face represented another general 
surprise for the international diplomatic circles, this being motivated by the need to avoid the 
transformation of the country into a theater of war, fact which would have had one of the most 
unfortunate consequences on the civilian population and on the economy in general. The logic of the act 
itself was a very good short-term initiative, however, the consequences derived from it would be baleful 
in terms of Romania’s domestic and international political future. 
The benefits brought to the Allied cause were huge, somewhat inversely proportional- critics say-to those 
acquired by Romania. Without neglecting the regaining of North Transylvania, one can say that the price 
paid by the army and the nation was unfairly high, great sacrifices being made, both on the front and on 
the inside for years to come. 
From a strategic perspective, Romania’s capitulation was for the German "ally" a real military and 
political disaster in materialized, according to Field Marshal Keitel, in the "loss not only of the Romanian 
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territory, but also that of Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, endangering the German army throughout the 
Balkans." Germany would thus be forced to withdraw all its military device from the Balkans in order to 
avoid being encircled by the Red Army offensive, the latter managing in the end to occupy Bulgaria 
without special fighting (Ciachir N., 1996). In addition to the loss of important defensive positions 
represented by the Carpathians, Germany would extensively be affected by the loss of food supplies and 
especially of the Romanian oil, thus making its combat forces some of the most overcast. 
Other findings illustrate Romania’s courageous attitude, which had been instrumental in tilting the 
balance in favor of the United Nations, "in a time when the odds of the war did not know who would end 
up in victory " the military manpower being estimated at about 70 divisions, which by the nature of the 
events had to be used. The services to the Allied cause cost Romania significant material reserves, not to 
mention the number of lives lost during the war, the real costs of the antifascist war placing the  
Romanian state on a respectable fourth place in the hierarchy of states participating in the war against 
Germany, before France, Yugoslavia and Australia. These considerations are particularly important 
because they were made by taking into account the limited period from August 1944 to May 1945, 
compared to the total period of the conflict, during which Romania participated alongside the United 
Nations. 
Romania’s coming over to the United Nations’ side would get the state in the "big camp of democratic 
states" but only for a short period of time.  
The further development of the military events on the front would have great impact on Romania’s 
internal situation which, though having assumed itself the status of ally , was treated as an occupied state. 
Romanian authorities prepared in detail the signing of the armistice, for this purpose by sending a 
delegation to Moscow, composed of LucreŃiu Pătrăşcanu, GhiŃă Pop, Dumitru Dămăceanu, Ion Christu, 
specialists in economic affairs and international law. Unfortunately, the content of discussions held in 
Moscow by the representatives of the Romanian government and those of the Allies was far from being a 
true negotiation, the Romanian side coming up with objections on different issues, most of them being 
ignored by the Soviet Prime Minister V. Molotov, the Allies’ chief negotiator. 
Despite the Soviet’s refusal to make concessions, the Anglo-Americans concluded that "Romanians left 
with the sense of having easily got off, the most important issues to them being how the armistice’s 
conditions would be" interpreted and applied by the Soviets (Quinlan P.D., 1995). " The implementation 
of the Armistice Agreement, signed on 12 September 1944, proved that Romanian delegation's concerns 
were fully grounded, which by then had been informed, through specific instructions sent by the 
government in Bucharest, about the behavior of the Soviet troops and the treatment the civil, military 
authorities and civilian population were subjected to.  
Unfortunately, along with the signing of the Armistice Agreement on 12 September 1944, the 
subordination of the Romanian army would become official, fact stated in the first article according to 
which "military operations of the Romanian armed forces, including naval and air forces against Germany 
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and Hungary, will be held under the leadership of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. All these paved the 
way for the text interpretation of the Armistice Agreement including the amount of debts and amends that 
Romania had to pay to the Soviet Union. The terms of the Convention were applied so strictly that 
Romania found it almost inevitable to meet them and therefore, had to pay penalties at a rate of 5% from 
the amount of arrears for each month of delay of the installments. 
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